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“Either I Close My Eyes or I Don’t”
The Evolution of Rights in Encounters between Sovereign Power
and “Rightless” Migrants
Daniel Kanstroom*
Around the world, harsh migration enforcement has sparked courageous humani-
tarian reactions. This, in turn, has led to hundreds of criminal prosecutions of aid
workers, volunteers, ship captains, and many others.1 As a major 2020 report by
Amnesty International entitled “Punishing Compassion” noted, “In recent years,
human rights defenders and civil society organizations that have helped refugees
and migrants have been subjected to unfounded criminal proceedings, undue
restrictions of their activities, intimidation, harassment, and smear campaigns in
several European countries.”2
Such prosecutions ostensibly seek to vindicate the power of governments
to control nation state borders. But, in a number of recent high-profile cases,
they seem, ironically, to have achieved the opposite: They have vindicated, re-
invigorated – and even inspired new forms of – basic human rights. Indeed, it is
noteworthy that the subtitle of the Amnesty Report was “Solidarity on Trial.”3 This
chapter explores how this has been happening and what it may portend.
Let us start with a brief introduction to perhaps the most famous such recent case.
In 2017, Cédric Herrou, a French olive farmer, was criminally tried for having
assisted unauthorized migrants in France, near the Italian border. Herrou, who
had been arrested numerous times before for similar offenses, was described as being
* Thanks to the excellent editors of this volume and to Julie Dahlstrom and Katie Young for
reading earlier drafts of this chapter and offering helpful suggestions. Thanks to Dean Vincent
Rougeau for research support.
1 N. Archer et al., “Hundreds of Europeans ‘Criminalised’ for HelpingMigrants,”OpenDemocracy,
May 18, 2019, www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/hundreds-of-europeans-criminalised-for-helping-
migrants-new-data-shows-as-far-right-aims-to-win-big-in-european-elections/; see also L. Vosyliūtė
and C. Conte,Crackdown on NGOs and Volunteers Helping Refugees and Other Migrants, www
.resoma.eu/node/194 (ReSOMA, June 2019).
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part of a quasi-clandestine resistance against the French government’s inhumane
response to the European migration and refugee “crisis” that began around 2015.4
He became an inspirational figure in some quarters as his actions – and the French
government’s reactions – provoked controversy and soul-searching around the
world. Indeed, a New York Times writer analogized Herrou’s movement to the
Underground Railroad.5
Perhaps more significant than his actions, Herrou’s legal cases have been both
complex and unusually resonant. After one arrest in 2016, prosecutors declined to
pursue charges because they accepted that Herrou was acting for “humanitarian
reasons.”6 As he became increasingly prominent and continued his work with
undocumented migrants, however, political and social pressures built. He was
rearrested and charged with serious offenses. Herrou was, to say the least, unrepent-
ant. At one of his trials, he testified, “My inaction and my silence would make me an
accomplice, I do not want to be an accomplice.”7 Eric Ciotti, president of the Alpes-
Maritimes department and a member of Parliament, held a quite different view:
“Who can say with certainty that of the hundreds of migrants that Mr. Herrou has
proudly brought across the border, there isn’t hidden among them, a future terror-
ist?”8 Ciotti argued more generally, “At the very moment when we need strict
controls, Mr. Herrou’s ideological, premeditated actions are a major risk.”9
Herrou described his motivation clearly. When asked by a judge, “Why do you do
all this,” he described French migration enforcement as “ignoble.”10 He evoked the
deepest, most basic human rights and humanitarian principles: “There are people
dying on the side of the road. It’s not right. There are children who are not safe.”
The prosecutor, however, argued that Herrou had demonstrated a “manifest inten-
tion to violate the law . . .. One can criticize it,” he continued, “but it’s got to be
applied.”11 As the prosecutor bemoaned, “This trial springs from a communications
strategy for a cause that I totally respect . . .. But I am the prosecutor. I must defend
the law.”12
4 A. Nossiter, “An Underground Railroad in France, Moving African Migrants,”New York Times,
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Similarly polarized arguments about migration enforcement and humanitarian
aid have been taking place in other criminal courts around the world. Two German
“rescue” ship captains, Carola Rackete and Pia Klemp, have faced criminal pros-
ecutions for rescuing distressed migrants at sea and bringing them to Lampedusa,
Italy. In 2017, Italy had enacted a restrictive and highly controversial “Code of
Conduct” pertaining to such rescues.13 Captain Rackete’s case was dismissed, but
Captain Klemp faced up to twenty years in prison.14 Echoing other human rights
activists, she has, with critical irony, referred to her prosecution as a “crime of
solidarity.”15 In Arizona, the US government has repeatedly prosecuted Scott
Daniel Warren, who was arrested and tried after allegedly providing food, water,
beds, and clean clothes to undocumented immigrants near Arizona’s Sonoran
Desert. His first trial resulted in a hung jury; the second in an outright acquittal,
much to the dismay of the prosecutors.16
Such tectonic tension between government sovereign power to enforce migration
rules and humanitarian or moral principles is not new. Criminal prosecutions of this
type typically implicate notions of criminal intent (mens rea) and construction of
ambiguous statutory terms. They may also implicate the so-called rule of lenity (the
principle that statutes ought to be construed narrowly against the government so that
people have a clear idea of what sort of conduct is criminally impermissible) or,
more basically, notions of “necessity” as a defense to criminal prosecution. But
Herrou prevailed through a different, new, and potentially deeply influential strat-
egy. “Remember the last word in the French Republic’s motto, ‘Liberté, Egalité,
Fraternité,’” his lawyer argued. “They are saying M. Herrou is endangering the
13 “Italy’s Code of Conduct for NGOs Involved in Migrant Rescue: Text,” Euronews, March 8,
2017, www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migra
nt-rescue.
14 L. Tondo and J. Le Blond, “Italian Judge Orders Release of Ship Captain Who Rescued
Refugees,” The Guardian, July 2, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/02/more-than-1m-
raised-for-rescue-ship-captain-carola-rackete-italy. On January 17, 2020, the Supreme Court of
Cassation of Italy rejected an appeal filed by Italian prosecutors of the dismissal of charges
against Carola Rackete. “Italy’s Highest Court Rejects Charges against Rescue Ship Captain,”
The Maritime Executive, January 17, 2020, www.maritime-executive.com/article/sea-rescue-
captain-cleared-of-charges-for-unauthorized-port-entry.
15 D. Boffey and L. Tondo, “Captain of Migrant Rescue Ship Says Italy ‘Criminalising
Solidarity,’” The Guardian, June 15, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/15/captain-
of-migrant-rescue-ship-says-italy-criminalising-solidarity; see also “La solidarité, plus que jamais
un delit?” Délinquants solidaires, January 2017, http://snpespjj-fsu.org/IMG/pdf/delinquants_
solidaires_manifeste.pdf (“Bien sûr, la solidarité n’a jamais été inscrite dans aucun code
comme un délit. Cependant, des militants associatifs qui ne font que venir en aide à des
personnes en situation de très grande précarité, victimes de décisions dangereuses, violentes,
voire inhumaines, se retrouvent aujourd’hui face à la justice.”); Brown, “France Prosecuting
Citizens.” See also F. Pusterla, “Legal Perspectives on Solidarity Crimes in Italy” (2020)
International Migration, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12740.
16 R. Devereaux, “Bodies in the Borderland,” The Intercept, May 4, 2019, https://theintercept
.com/2019/05/04/no-more-deaths-scott-warren-migrants-border-arizona/.
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Republic. On the contrary, I think he is defending its values.”17 Herrou was con-
victed at trial. However, in a landmark decision, the French Constitutional Council
overturned the verdict and held, for the first time, that fraternity is a principle with
constitutional value: “The freedom to help others for a humanitarian purpose,
regardless of the regularity of their stay on the national territory follows from this
principle.”18 In related, if less constitutionally portentous formulations, Captains
Klemp and Rackete appealed to the ideal of solidarity in their defense. Warren’s
attorney, in closing argument, intoned to the jury, “Being a good Samaritan is not
against the law, following the golden rule is not a felony.”19
This chapter considers certain basic human rights and politico-legal questions
illustrated by these cases and others like them: What is the full extent of the “law?”
What effects might such cases have on human rights law in general, and migrant
rights more specifically?20 It suggests that these prosecutions illustrate how human
rights laws and principles are tested – and sometimes expanded – at the intersections
of sovereign power, law, and compelling moral claims.
The analysis herein transcends previous initiatives designed to protect “human
rights defenders.”21 As migration enforcement has taken increasingly harsh and life-
threatening turns in recent decades, new principles are evolving and connecting in
deep ways with extant and inchoate constitutional principles. The more vigorous
governments become in harsh migration enforcement, the more such principles are
invoked, and the greater power they may assume. This implicates deep questions of
constitutional legitimacy and migrant rights as it also illustrates how rights develop
and evolve. The process of creating rights is not primarily confined – as some
interpreters of Hannah Arendt argue – to the internal processes of the nation-state.
Nor is it intrinsically tied to the so-called right to have rights of those with member-
ship in a political community. Rather, rights often arise from encounters between
raw state sovereign power and ostensibly extralegal, humanitarian actions for those at
the lowest ebb of their power and with the least legal status (what Agamben has
17 Nossiter, “A Smuggler’s Defense” (emphasis added).
18 Conseil constitutionnel décision no. 2018-717/718 QPC, July 6, 2018, www.conseil-constitutio
nnel.fr/en/decision/2018/2018717_718QPC.htm.
19 P. Ingram, “Scott Warren Found Not Guilty by Jury in No More Deaths Case,” Tucson
Sentinel, November 20, 2019, www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/112019_warren_trial_day_
6/scott-warren-found-not-guilty-by-jury-no-more-deaths-case/.
20 See generally D. Kanstroom, “‘Alien’ Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power of a
‘Voteless Class of Litigants’” (2012) 21(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 399, https://
scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol21/iss2/5/.
21 See, e.g., Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, March 8, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144. The Declaration has been said to have
“shifted the understanding of the human rights project: from a task accomplished mainly
through the international community and States, to one that belongs to every person and group
within society.” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders,
U.N. Doc. A/73/215 (July 23, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/A/73/215.
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called “bare life”).22 Such encounters demand a coherent legal response, which may
be developed, if imperfectly, through such notions as fraternité and solidarity. These
principles may enhance more well-accepted rights formulations such as dignity and
equality as they engage the border between those who lack rights and those who seek
to protect lives.
Such an analysis also helps us to understand and critique more technical initia-
tives, such as the European Union’s 2002 “Facilitation Directive” and the so-called
Facilitators’ Package, which requests that member states criminalize behaviors that
“facilitate” irregular entry, transit, and stay, aiming toward a consistent approach.23
However, as a study commissioned by the European Parliament concluded, the
European Union has brought about “legislative ambiguity and legal uncertainty.”24
Fundamental questions remain unresolved. As Captain Klemp poignantly argued, “I
refuse to believe that we live in a Europe where you have to go to jail for saving lives
in need.”25
herrou: “there are people dying on the side of the road.
it’s not right.”
26
The so-called European migration or refugee “crisis” that began in 2015 spawned not
only reactionary politics and harsh policies but also creative legal responses at the
22 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1998).
23 In 2002, the EU adopted the “Facilitation Directive,” which defines “facilitation of unauthorized
entry, transit and stay.” Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28
November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32002L0090 (December 5,
2002). An accompanying Council Framework Decision strengthened the penal framework to
prevent such facilitation. Council of the European Union, Council framework Decision of
28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of
unauthorized entry, transit and residence, 2002/946/JHA, OJ L 328 (December 5, 2001), https://
eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32002F0946.
24 Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and Criminalisation of
Humanitarian Assistance to Irregular Migrants, (Brussels: European Parliament, 2016), p. 10,
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_STU(2016)536490_EN
.pdf; Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department for Citizens’
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the
Criminalisation of Humanitarian Assistance to Irregular Migrants: 2018 Update (Brussels:
European Parliament, 2018), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/608838/
IPOL_STU(2018)608838_EN.pdf; see also Amnesty International, Punishing Compassion,
p. 20.
25 J. Beenen and V. Wulf, “I’ve Never Been to Sea for Fun,” Basler Zeitung, www.bazonline.ch/
ich-war-noch-nie-zum-spass-auf-see/story/31855284.
26 A. Nossiter, “Farmer on Trial Defends Smuggling Migrants: ‘I Am a Frenchman,’” New York
Times, January 5, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/world/europe/cedric-herrou-migrant-smu
ggler-trial-france.html.
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intersections of sovereign power and basic human rights.27 For example, a reinstate-
ment of migration controls at the French–Italian border in November 2016 made
the Roya Valley a dangerous crossing point for migrants seeking to enter France. In
addition to other methods of police intimidation, harassment, and investigation,
French prosecutors, since at least 2016, have brought criminal charges against
activists and volunteers who assist migrants and asylum seekers.28 Although many
prosecutions resulted only in suspended sentences, they took a significant toll on the
accused and contributed to the creation of “a hostile environment for humanitarian
work in the region.”29 Indeed, a recent study found that between 2015 and 2019, at
least eighty-three people have been investigated or prosecuted in Europe for facili-
tating irregular entry and transit, and eighteen were investigated or prosecuted for
facilitating the stay or residence of migrants and asylum seekers.30
Pursuant to the French Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit
d’asile (CESEDA), any person who, directly or indirectly, facilitates the illegal entry,
circulation, or residence of a foreign national in France or on the territory of another
contracting party of the Schengen Agreement shall be sentenced to five years’
imprisonment with a fine of €30,000.31 The statute has long contained two exemp-
tions: certain close relatives of the foreign national,32 and the facilitation of illegal
residence (“irregular stay”) of a foreigner when the alleged act does not give rise to
any direct or indirect compensation and only entails providing legal advice, food,
accommodation, or health care in order to ensure decent living conditions for
27 The term “crisis,” though clearly inapt in various ways, is used herein to describe European
migration events since 2015 because it was a staple of media reporting at the time and since. See
“Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts,” BBC, March 4, 2016, www
.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (“More than a million migrants and refugees crossed
into Europe in 2015, sparking a crisis as countries struggled to cope with the influx, and creating
division in the EU over how best to deal with resettling people.”). Moreover, there has been
substantial debate about the usage of the term “migrant,” which connotes voluntariness, versus
“refugee,” to describe the people seeking to enter Europe in recent years. See, e.g., C. Ruz,
“The Battle over the Words Used to Describe Migrants,” BBC, August 28, 2015, www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-34061097.
28 Human Rights Watch, Subject to Whim: The Treatment of Unaccompanied Migrant Children
in the French Hautes-Alps (2019), pp. 68–72, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/franc
e0919_web_0.pdf.
29 Ibid.
30 Vosyliūtė and Conte, Crackdown, p. 25 (“[Fifty-seven] persons are prosecuted simultaneously
on both the grounds of the facilitation of entry and stay of migrants and other grounds
including membership of a criminal organisation, sabotage or waste management contracts.”);
see also L. Fekete, F. Webber, and A. Edmond-Pettitt, Humanitarianism: The Unacceptable
Face of Solidarity (London: Institute of Race Relations, 2017).
31 Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigner and Right of Asylum (CESEDA), art. L. 622-1 www
.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=06DA61E11833B73124F3B0AEDCFD23B7
.tplgfr34s_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006147789&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&
dateTexte=20200728; see also Editorial, “Fraternité” (2019) 15 European Constitutional Law
Review 183–193.
32 CESEDA, art. L. 622-4, §§ 1–2.
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foreigners, or any other assistance aimed at preserving their dignity or physical
integrity.33 However, neither the facilitation of illegal entry nor illegal circulation
(internal movement or transportation) are covered by the statutory exemptions.
Herrou and Pierre-Alain Mannoni, a marine ecology research professor, were
criminally prosecuted for assisting several illegal immigrants en route from Sudan
and Eritrea via Italy. Herrou was already well known for this work. Mannoni was
arrested after he picked up three Eritrean women who had just crossed into France,
intending to give them a ride to Nice. He described having seen them suffering on
the roadside: “They are afraid, they are cold, they are exhausted, they have bandages
on their hands, on their legs.”34 Herrou and Mannoni were convicted and given
suspended prison sentences of, respectively, four and two months for facilitating the
entry and/or circulation of illegal immigrants in France. Both appealed to the Cour
de cassation, the supreme civil and criminal court in France. Their respective
counsel then raised a “QPC” (question prioritaire deconstitutionnalité)35 disputing
the compatibility of the criminal statute with the principle of fraternity, in addition
to other arguments. The Cour de cassation referred that question to the Conseil
constitutionnel.
In its now famous decision of July 6, 2018, the Conseil held that fraternity is in fact
a principle endowed with constitutional value in France.36 The Conseil then
concluded that the freedom to help one another, for humanitarian reasons –
regardless of whether the assisted person is legally residing or not within the French
territory – follows from the principle of fraternity. The Conseil made clear, however,
that such freedom does not guarantee a general and absolute right of entry to – or
even residence – on French national territory. The Conseil said that the legislature
has the responsibility to “strike a balance” between freedom and fraternity in the
fight against illegal immigration and a different constitutional objective: that of
safeguarding “public order.”37 Thus, the decision contained an innovative approach
to individual constitutional rights even as it reinforced rather traditional notions of
fundamental government sovereign power and public order.
The Conseil essentially narrowed the offense and broadened the exemption as a
matter of constitutional principle. It concluded, rather technically, that the legisla-
ture had failed to strike an appropriate balance between fraternity and public order
by limiting the scope of the exemption to providing assistance for irregular stay
33 Ibid., § 3.
34 Human Rights Watch, Subject to Whim, p. 68.
35 The QPC is a 2008 constitutional reform, 1958 Const. art. 61-1, that allows plaintiffs to raise an
issue relating to the compatibility of legislation with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution.
36 Consiel constitutionnel decision No. 2018-717/718, July 6, 2018. The Conseil cited Article 2 of
the Constitution, which contains the triadic Republican maxim, the Preamble, and Article 72-
3, which refer to “the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity” between the French
Republic and its overseas territories and populations. Ibid. } 7.
37 Ibid., } 13.
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(“illegal residence”). The facilitation of illegal circulation (movement) was worthy
of inclusion as an exemption to render the legislation constitutionally sound.38
Recognizing the limitations of its legitimate role, however, the Conseil postponed
the implementation of parts of its ruling. The immediate abolition of the contested
parts of the statute might have had “clearly excessive consequences,” for example,
the effect of extending the criminal exemptions established in Article L. 622-4 to
actions that facilitate or attempt to facilitate illegal entry into French territory.
Therefore, it was up to the Parliament to determine the modifications that must
be made in order to remedy the ascertained unconstitutional aspects of the
prosecution.39
Simply put, the Conseil was treading a fine line between announcing rights-based
enforcement limitations and superseding the state’s sovereign authority to control its
external borders. Still, as of the day of the publication of its decision, Herrou would
be exempt from prosecution for “humanitarian acts that aimed to facilitate the
circulation of illegal immigrants when the latter is ancillary to their residence.”40
A key, if rather complicated, line was maintained: “The assistance provided to the
foreign national for his or her circulation does not necessarily give rise, as a
consequence thereof, to an unlawful situation, in contrast with the assistance
provided for his or her entry.”41 In other words, according to the Conseil, facilitating
unlawful presence that has already been achieved is different for constitutional
fraternity purposes than is assistance that enables entry.
The French legislature, called upon to act, did so quickly. The extant exemption
was largely rewritten. It now covers all acts facilitating illegal circulation or residence
that do not give rise to any direct or indirect compensation and that consist of
providing legal advice, linguistic or social assistance, or any other assistance with an
exclusively humanitarian objective.42 The criminal cases were then remanded.
Herrou was not necessarily completely liberated, either from this case or from future
similar prosecutions. Indeed, the practical reach of the Conseil decision was, as
noted, quite narrow. A key issue will now be “facilitation of entry.” This remains an
offense in France, whether or not motivated by humanitarian purpose.
Still, the Herrou decision has major implications. The substantive reliance on the
fraternity principle – as a constitutional provision with real bite – may justifiably be
called a milestone in French jurisprudence.43 Indeed, the resonance of this case has
led some to refer to the “Pandora’s box” of fraternity as a fundamental rights
38 Ibid., }} 13–15.
39 Ibid., } 23
40 Ibid., } 13.
41 Ibid., }} 12, 24.
42 See Art. 38 of Law No. 2018-778 of September 10, 2018 for contained immigration, an effective
right to asylum and successful integration; Editorial, “Fraternité” at 4.
43 Editorial, “Fraternité” at 5.
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principle.44 Moreover, the assertion by the Conseil of such broad interpretive and
constitutional review power is a form of judicial authority that raises profound
separation of powers questions. This is especially true in the legal realms of immi-
gration and asylum, where deference to the government is typically strong.
To appreciate these phenomena more generally, let us now consider analogous
cases in other legal systems: those of Captains Rackete and Klemp in Italy and of
Scott Warren in the United States.
the rescue captains, rackete and klemp: the “crime
of solidarity”
The French Conseil’s affirmation of strong deference to government power at the
border – an exception to its elaboration of the fraternité principle – is echoed in all
legal systems. It has had particularly powerful consequences in Italy, where thou-
sands of desperate migrants have faced death on the Mediterranean for many years.
From 2014 to 2018, more than 600,000 migrants attempted the perilous crossing
from North Africa to Europe.45 More than 10,000 people drowned.46 In addition to
government and EU-led rescue missions – many of which were widely criticized by
human rights groups – European NGOs began to charter ships to monitor the
waters off Libya, rescuing migrants and transporting them to Sicily.47 This led
Matteo Salvini, Italy’s hardline, anti-immigrant interior minister, leader of the
ultranationalist Lega (League) party, to close Italian waters to NGO rescue ships.48
Malta soon followed suit. Several such boats were stranded at sea for weeks. Salvini,
motivated by anti-immigrant sentiment and also concerned that France and other
EU countries had not assumed what he saw as their share of the “burden,” said: “We
will use every lawful means to stop an outlaw ship, which puts dozens of migrants at
risk for a dirty political game.”49 His understanding of the word “lawful” was soon to
be tested.
44 See G. Canivet, “La fraternité dans le droit constitutionnel français,” in Conférence en
l’honneur de Charles Doherty Gonthier, May 20–21, 2011, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/la-
fraternite-dans-le-droit-constitutionnel-francais; see also Editorial, “Fraternité” at 5.
45 C. Stephen, “Italy Bars Two More Refugee Ships from Ports,” The Guardian, June 16, 2018,
www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/16/italy-bars-two-more-refugee-ships-from-ports.
46 See “Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes,”Missing Migrants, https://missingmigrants.iom
.int/region/mediterranean.
47 Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over Rescues Put Lives at Risk, www.refworld
.org/docid/5b646a9f4.html (2018).
48 Stephen, “Italy Bars Two More Refugee Ships.” The Lega governed Italy until September
2019 in a coalition with the antiestablishment Five Star Movement (M5S).
49 L. Tondo, “Migrant Rescue Ship Defies Salvini’s Ban to Enter Italian Port,” The Guardian,
June 26, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/26/ngo-boat-carrying-migrants-defies-mat
teo-salvini-veto-lampedusa-italy.
134 Daniel Kanstroom
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Boston College, on 14 Dec 2021 at 22:48:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
In June 2019, following a grim, two-week standoff with Italian authorities, the Sea-
Watch 3 docked at the Sicilian island of Lampedusa with forty-two rescued migrants
on board.50 One of the rescued migrants, a man from Ivory Coast, said in a video,
“We can’t hold on any longer. It’s like we’re in a prison because we are deprived of
everything. Help us, think of us.”51 The captain, Carola Rackete, had knowingly
defied Salvini’s ban. In a video, Rackete said: “I know this is risky and that I will
probably lose the boat, but the 42 shipwrecked on board are exhausted. I will bring
them to safety.”
Sea-Watch 3 declined to bring the migrants to Tripoli, as Italy had demanded.
“Libya is not a safe country,” said spokesperson Giorgia Linardi. “Forcibly taking
rescued people back to a war-torn country, having them imprisoned and tortured, is
a crime that we will never commit.”52 Salvini, however, called the Sea-Watch 3 “an
outlaw ship.” By early evening, the ship was about two to three nautical miles away
from Lampedusa when it was boarded by Italian financial police. A Sea-Watch 3
spokesperson, Ruben Neugebauer, said: “We are waiting for Italian authorities now.
There is not much more we can do. We will not run away.”
Rackete was charged with criminal offenses, but the charges were dismissed in
July 2019. Judge Alessandra Vella, among other concerns, opined that the crew’s
actions were justified under the circumstances “in the performance of duty” and
found that neither Libya nor Tunisia were safe ports. The judge further concluded
that Salvini’s decree should not apply to rescue operations, but only to human
trafficking. Salvini, unrepentant, said that Captain Rackete would be expelled to
Germany because she was “dangerous for national security.”53
In a related case, Pia Klemp, the captain of the Iuventa, another rescue vessel, was
accused with nine others of aiding and abetting illegal migration in relation to their
role in seeking to rescue people in danger after fleeing Libya. The charges carry a
prison term of up to twenty years or a €15,000 fine for each person illegally brought
to Italy.54 This grim test of will, power, and principle shows little signs of definitive
resolution. However, it has become clear that criminal law has become a fulcrum
upon which to balance larger political and rights principles. A petition in support of
Captain Klemp and her crew, signed by some 71,000 people, intones: “If the crew
were convicted, it would be the end of humanity in Europe.”55 A court in Sicily
50 Ibid.
51 Sea-Watch International (@seawatch_intl), Twitter (June 24, 2019), https://twitter.com/sea
watch_intl/status/1143251415374225409.
52 Ibid.
53 Sea-Watch International (@seawatch_intl), Twitter (July 2, 2019), https://twitter.com/seawatch_
intl/status/1146178020664889345.
54 Boffey and Tondo, “Captain of Migrant Rescue Ship.”
55 See “Stop the Prosecution of Those Who Are Saving Lives in the Mediterranean Sea,”Change.
org, www.change.org/p/we-demand-impunity-for-saving-lives-at-the-mediterran-sea-freepia.
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ruled in January 2019 that Salvini himself could be charged with kidnapping after he
prevented refugees from disembarking from an Italian coast guard ship in August.
“I confess,” Salvini taunted back, “there is no need for a trial. It’s true, I did it and I’d
do it again.”56
In June 2019, Italy’s government closed Italian ports to migrant rescue ships and
threatened fines of up to €50,000 and impounding of the vessel.57 Claudia Lodesani,
president of Médecins Sans Frontières in Italy, said: “The new decree is threatening
legal principles and the duty of saving lives. It is like fining ambulances for carrying
patients to hospital.”58 Carlotta Sami, the spokesperson for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said: “If we do not intervene soon, there will
be a sea of blood.”59 In September 2019, a new agreement was reached pursuant to
which Germany and France would take in 25 percent each of the migrants onboard
another rescue ship, the Ocean Viking. Other EU states, including Italy, would
process the others. Following a meeting with the European Council president,
Donald Tusk, in Brussels, Conte said EU member states that refused to share the
burden of the arrival of migrants should face financial penalties. Salvini, though out
of power, was unwavering: “The new government has opened again its seaports to
migrants,” Salvini said, “The new ministers must hate our country. Italy is back to
being Europe’s refugee camp.”60
Meanwhile, although the number of desperate migrants seeking to cross the
Mediterranean has decreased recently, it is clear that risks have remained severe.61
As the UNHCR notes, “it is likely that reductions to search and rescue capacity
coupled with an uncoordinated and unpredictable response to disembarkation led
to an increased death rate as people continued to flee their countries due to conflict,
human rights violations, persecution, and poverty.”62
56 E. Schumacher, “Italy: Court Rules Far-Right Leader Salvini Can Be Charged with
Kidnapping,” DW, January 24, 2019, www.dw.com/en/italy-court-rules-far-right-leader-salvini-
can-be-charged-with-kidnapping/a-47224819.
57 L.Tondo, “Italy AdoptsDecree that Could FineMigrant Rescuers up to €50,000,”TheGuardian,




60 L. Tondo, “Italy’s New Government Says Migrants Can Disembark from Rescue Boat,” The
Guardian, September 14, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/italys-new-govern
ment-says-migrants-can-disembark-from-rescue-boat.
61 C. Mainwaring, “At Europe’s Edge: Migration and Crisis in the Mediterranean,” Border
Criminologies, October 14, 2019, www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-crimin
ology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/10/europes-edge; see also “Mediterranean Migrant
Arrivals Reach 76,558 in 2019; Deaths Reach 1,071,” IOM, November 10, 2019, www.iom.int/
news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-76558-2019-deaths-reach-1071.
62 UNHCR, Desperate Journeys: Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe’s
Borders, January–December 2018 (2019), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/6771
2#_ga=2.70740368.1640035127.1578321369-48067902.1578321369.
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warren: water in the desert
The government failed in its attempt to criminalize basic human kindness.63
At least 7,000 migrants who have tried to cross the parched lands of the southern
United States near the Mexican border since the 1990s have died doing so.64 The
deaths are a terrible consequence of “prevention through deterrence,” a border
control strategy first developed during the Clinton administration.65 The Border
Patrol built barriers in traditional entry points near urban areas such as El Paso to
push border crossers out into more remote and dangerous terrain. Doris Meissner,
then-Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (which at the
time included the Border Patrol), later described the plan in remarkably optimistic
terms, suggesting that policymakers believed that once people saw how perilous the
new routes were, they would stop trying. As Meissner put it in 2019, “The deaths
weren’t contemplated. Obviously, one can’t be anything but regretful about the
deaths.”66 As a 1994 Border Patrol memorandum had put it, however, the essential
idea from the beginning was to disrupt traditional entry and smuggling routes so that
“illegal traffic will be deterred or forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for
crossing and more suited for enforcement.”67 The planners knew that those who were
thus compelled to avoid traditional routes could “find themselves in mortal danger.”
Indeed, the Border Patrol cruelly envisioned that “violence will increase as effects of
the strategy are felt.”68
The human costs of this strategy soon became horribly clear. By 1998, the Border
Patrol launched the “Border Safety Initiative,” a set of measures to warn migrants
about risks, rescue those in trouble, and quantify border-crossing deaths. But the
initiative left it up to leaders in each of the Border Patrol’s nine Southwest border
sectors to decide which bodies to count and how. By the mid-2000s, the rising death
toll continued to raise hard questions. In a 2006 report, grimly entitled, “Border-
Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995,” the Government Accountability Office
found that the Border Patrol had consistently understated the numbers of deaths.69
Moreover, federal authorities had failed to ask local law enforcement agencies,
63 J. Augilera, “Humanitarian Scott Warren Found Not Guilty after Retrial for Helping Migrants
at Mexican Border,” Time, November 21, 2019, https://time.com/5732485/scott-warren-trial-not-
guilty/.
64 B. Ortega, “Border Patrol Failed to Count Hundreds of Migrant Deaths on US Soil,” CNN,
May 15, 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/05/14/us/border-patrol-migrant-death-count-invs/index.html.





69 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have
Doubled since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated
(August 2006), www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf.
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coroner’s offices, and others about cases. Still, diversion to hostile terrain has been a
major part of US policy now for a quarter century.
Scott Warren, when arrested, was a thirty-seven-year-old geographer and a volun-
teer with NoMore Deaths (aka No Más Muertes), an aid group that leaves water and
food for migrants who seek to cross the deadly Sonoran Desert. This group, along
with others, was inspired by the so-called Sanctuary Movement of the late 1980s.70
As described by one of the Sanctuary Movement’s leaders, Reverend John Fife of the
Southside United Presbyterian Church in Tucson, No More Deaths left water and
provided medical aid. But it also documented abuses on the border, as “the most
aggressive organization to challenge Border Patrol violations of human rights.” Fife
noted, “If you look at the founding principles of the Sanctuary Movement and No
More Deaths, they’re the same: ‘civil initiative.’” As he elaborated, “if government
isn’t fulfilling its obligations, it’s up to civil society members to step in.”71 As one
local activist put it,
When you think of how tiny our town is, and when you think of the number of
bodies that were recovered last year – like 58 or 60 bodies that were recovered
here – I can’t imagine that happening in any town in our country and not having
people be up in arms . . . you have to do something. You don’t want to be a
cemetery. These are human lives.72
Warren was arrested by Border Patrol agents on January 17, 2018.73 No More
Deaths had just published a report that had implicated the Border Patrol in the
destruction of thousands of gallons of water left for migrants in the desert.74 As one
reporter noted, it now seemed that the Border Patrol was “punching back.”75 The
agents caught Warren with two Central American migrants. Warren told the
agents that he had given the migrants shelter, food, and first aid. All of this seemed
to the agents to clearly violate US law, which bars “harboring” and “transporting”
unauthorized migrants. The Border Patrol and prosecutors – unmoved by Warren’s
humanitarian motives – argued that he was assisting the migrants to evade custody.
He was charged with two counts of harboring undocumented immigrants and one
count of conspiracy to harbor and transport. He faced some twenty years in prison.
Also, in a particularly bizarre exercise of state power, Warren, along with nine other
volunteers, faced federal charges of littering for leaving water on the Cabeza Prieta
National Wildlife Refuge.76
70 This movement, some of whose members had been convicted at that time, also inspired civil
legal action that led to the creation of Temporary Protected Status in US law. Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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At Warren’s first trial in June 2019, the jury failed to reach a verdict.77 The
government quickly sought a retrial, although it dropped the conspiracy charge.
After a six-day retrial in Tucson, Arizona, in November 2019, the jury found Warren
not guilty after about two hours of deliberation. Reports from the trial and conversa-
tions with jurors might seem to indicate that Warren’s case was quite different from
those of Herrou and the captains. His lawyers did not mount an explicit “necessity
defense” (i.e., arguing that Warren should not be criminally punished for avoiding a
greater harm to others). Nor did they expressly argue for jury nullification to override
the letter of the law in the pursuit of abstract ideals of higher justice. Warren’s
lawyers simply argued that the government had not proven criminal intent, some-
thing that was surely rather nebulous under these circumstances. The government
had devoted enormous resources to investigation and surveillance. They had evi-
dence. Warren, for example, was observed with the migrants pointing northward.
Prosecutors argued that this meant he was guiding the migrants away from the
border and deeper into the United States. But Warren testified that he was merely
showing them local mountains.78 He said that the only available highway ran
between them. If they needed rescue, that’s where they should go. But if they
strayed outside of those mountains, they would find an active US bombing range
and deadly desert.79
How should a jury decide such questions? One can hear the echoes of Warren’s
humanitarian motives and sense the larger debates about harm and justice in every
facet of the case. Warren testified that the work he and others do is similar to that of
the International Red Cross: neutral provision of aid amidst humanitarian crisis.
From this, one gleans a hint of necessity and nullification. Such work, he said, is
legal. The jury accepted this, apparently completely. One juror reportedly said, “He
77 This was not the first encounter between No More Deaths and federal law enforcement. See
ibid. In 2005, volunteers Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss were arrested and charged with
multiple felony smuggling and conspiracy counts, after driving three seriously ill migrants to
John Fife’s church for medical care. “Volunteers Fight Arrests for Aiding Illegals,” Associated
Press, April 2, 2006, www.deseret.com/2006/4/2/19946256/volunteers-fight-arrests-for-aiding-ille
gals. US District Judge Raner C. Collins dismissed the charges on the grounds that the
volunteers had followed a protocol that they understood to be in line with the law, with full
knowledge of the Border Patrol. D. Grossman, “‘NoMore Deaths’ Volunteer Charges Tossed,”
Arizona Daily Star, September 2, 2006, https://tucson.com/news/local/border/no-more-deaths-
volunteer-charges-tossed/article_86d4dc0d-ddf7–5b9c-9f8e-e5303d83edb2.html. In 2008, Daniel
J. Millis, caught with other volunteers in an SUV loaded with water jugs on the Buenos Aires
National Wildlife Refuge, was convicted of littering. He had been found guilty of “Disposal of
Waste” pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a). His conviction was overturned by a 2-to-1 vote at the
Ninth Circuit. The judges found that the term “garbage” in the regulation under which Millis
was prosecuted is ambiguous, and applied the “rule of lenity” to vacate the conviction. United
States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2010); see generally, K. Campbell, “Humanitarian
Aid Is Never a Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of
Sanctuary” (2012) 63 Syracuse Law Review 71.
78 Devereaux, “Bodies in the Borderland.”
79 Ibid.
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seemed like a humanitarian that was just trying to help. He seemed very kind and
not like he was trying to harbor somebody or do anything illegal at all.”80 As another
juror put it, nullification of the law was not necessary: “There was just too much of a
lack of evidence to convict,” he said. “I think we can all agree, it was the intent . . ..”
But a third juror chimed in after the trial: “I think we all agreed,” she said, “what he
and these people do is fantastic.”81
In the end, Warren’s jury – through their interpretation of his intent – policed the
border between law and deep values. The prosecutor, a US attorney, did not see it
this way. After the not guilty verdict, he promised that in future cases his office
“won’t distinguish between whether somebody is trafficking or harboring for money
or whether they’re doing it out of, you know, what I would say is a misguided sense
of social justice or belief in open borders or whatever.”82 One of Warren’s lawyers,
Amy Knight, was offended by the word “misguided,” seeing it as “a value judgment,
not a legal judgment.” As she paraphrased the instructions that had been given to the
jury, “If you’re doing it out of a sense of social justice, then you don’t intend to
violate the law.”83
the potential power and limitations of fraternity
I speak an open and disengaged language, dictated by no passion but that of humanity . . . my
country is the world, and my religion is to do good.84
The cases of Cédric Herrou, Captains Rackete and Klemp, and Scott Warren clearly
involve distinct, technical legal questions and different sociopolitical backdrops.
However, the fundamental issues they present have much in common, whether
understood through the lens of fraternity, solidarity, necessity, or more general
implicit values of justice and fairness that always guide interpretations of facts and
law. These questions, most simply put, are:
1. What legal principles may be invoked when humanitarian actions impede
or conflict with government power over “unauthorized” migrants?
2. Where do such principles come from and how do they evolve?
The idea that a particular doctrinal formulation is all one might need to inspire
judges and legislatures to humanize border practices and to protect the fundamental





84 T. Paine, The Rights of Man (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1996), part II, p. 181.
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the potential of power of fraternity, compared to solidarity, necessity, equality or
even dignity, is worth considering.
Fraternity
Although the roots of fraternity as a philosophical principle may be traced back
through antiquity, its resonant strength – and certain historically well-known and
ideological objections to it – may be most directly traced back to its origins as a
motto of the French Revolution.85 Though its evolution as a politico-legal concept
in France was rather slow and tentative, it was eventually incorporated into the
1958 Constitution.
Though some suggest – following Diderot – that fraternity may be largely a
euphemism for the ostensibly broader concept of “humanity,” fraternity is a
narrower ideal that, in some respects, may paradoxically be a stronger source of
obligation than humanity to those who arrive from outside of a particular civil
society.86
Some, however, view fraternity as a rather limited, highly interpersonal concept.
Wilson Carey McWilliams, for example, in a 1973 book entitled The Idea of
Fraternity in America, saw fraternity as “a bond based on intense interpersonal
affection.” It was thus “limited in the number of persons and in the social space
to which it can be extended.” Moreover, it “implies a necessary tension with loyalty
to society at large.”87 But this seems a rather parsimonious approach when com-
pared to obligations that go beyond charity and beyond narrow conceptions of
interpersonal relations or community.88 Since the Enlightenment, fraternity has
often been said to transcend a “feeling of a community and the demand for
communion.”89 Rather, it “postulated an order based on the equality of men.”90
Whether that order – what Robespierre once called les doux noeuds de la fraternité
(“the sweet knots of brotherhood”) – is confined to the “Fatherland” or extends
beyond that to a global community of values has always been an important if
implicit question at the heart of the fraternity principle.91
85 C. D. Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Forgotten Leg of the Trilogy, or Fraternity:
The Unspoken Third Pillar of Democracy” (2000) 45(3) McGill Law Journal 567–589 at 570.
86 Ibid. It may certainly be stronger once they have become, in any way, a part of the fraternal
community. But even before that universal “brotherhood” seems a stronger principle than
simply being members of the same species.
87 W. C. McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973), p. 7.
88 P. Vernière, “L’idée d’humanité au XVIII siècle” in Lumières ou clair-obscur? (Paris: Presses




91 J. Boulad-Ayoub, Contre nous de la tyrannie. . .: Des relations idéologiques entre Lumières et
Révolution (Quebec: Hurtubise HMH, 1989), p. 58.
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More recent invocations have sought to situate fraternity within broader theories
of justice, fairness, equality, and liberty.92 As former Canadian Supreme Court
Justice Charles Gonthier wrote, fraternity advances core values that relate to forming
a community.93 It is in this sense a dynamic, evolutionary, aspirational, and ideal-
ized concept. Its related values, which he termed “interrelated threads weaving the
cloth of fraternity,” include empathy, cooperation, commitment, responsibility,
fairness, trust, and equity.94 If the essence of fraternity is based on membership in
a community, however, it is puzzling how it could ground a theory of rights to
outsiders, or “others.” McWilliams’ argument that fraternity “is limited in the
number of persons and in the social space to which it can be extended” could thus
be a significant limitation.95 The broader view, as Pope Francis recently explained,
is much more powerful: “Universal fraternity and social friendship are . . . two
inseparable and equally vital poles in every society.”96 Fraternity, understood in this
way, is “born not only of a climate of respect for individual liberties, or even of a
certain administratively guaranteed equality. Fraternity necessarily calls for some-
thing greater, which in turn enhances freedom and equality.”97 Social friendship
and universal fraternity both “necessarily call for an acknowledgement of the worth
of every human person, always and everywhere.”98 Most relevant for our purposes:
“No one, then, can remain excluded because of his or her place of birth, much less
because of privileges enjoyed by others who were born in lands of greater opportun-
ity. The limits and borders of individual states cannot stand in the way of this . . ..”99
As Justice Gonthier noted, “fraternity may be universal in its object,” but it has
specific applications.100 Broad universal values of fraternity may, for example, be
seen – in a relevant analogy to the Herrou matter – in the rather narrowly fraternal
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which contains a unique Good
Samaritan provision.101
92 See e.g., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 105.
93 Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” at p. 570.
94 Ibid.
95 McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America, p. 7.
96 Encyclical Letter Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father Francis on Fraternity and Social Friendship,
October 3, 2020, Par. 142, http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/pap
a-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html.
97 Ibid., } 103.
98 Ibid., } 106.
99 Ibid., } 121.
100 Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” at p. 575.
101 Section 2 reads:
Every human being whose life is in peril has a right to assistance.
Every person must come to the aid of anyone whose life is in peril, either personally or
calling for aid, by giving him the necessary and immediate physical assistance, unless it
involves danger to himself or a third person, or he has another valid reason.
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, chp. 6, § 2, June 27, 1975, http://legisquebec
.gouv.qc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/c-12.
142 Daniel Kanstroom
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108914994.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Boston College, on 14 Dec 2021 at 22:48:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
If fraternity were to be limited only to Good Samaritan ideals, however, then it
would seem to amount to little more than charity, a relatively uncontroversial notion
that does not imply much in the way of rights. The Herrou case, however, implies
that fraternity is potentially more resonant and powerful than this. And for this
reason, it has provoked historically well-known objections. Conservatives have long
recoiled at the abstract ideal of love of “mankind,” particularly when clothed in the
language of brotherhood. James Fitzjames Stephen, for example, in his 1873 critique
of the neo-utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,
offered a stinging rejoinder to proponents of universal fraternity. Though admitting
as “common ground” that “upon some terms and to some extent it is desirable that
men should wish well to and should help each other,” Stephen expressed a feeling
of disgust . . . for expressions of general philanthropy” that he saw as “an insulting
intrusion.”102
The potential power of fraternity as a legal concept derives from the fact that it
does not necessarily demand a clear choice between a cosmopolitan view of rights
and a Burkean idea of rights as “a patrimony derived from . . . forefathers.”103
Fraternity imbues charity with implications of universal obligation. This accounts
for its invocation as the spiritual admonition in the very first article Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”104 In its recognition of the constitutional
principle of fraternity in the Herrou matter, the Conseil constitutionnel thus articu-
lated a humanistic, universal interpretation ideal deeply related to the Declaration
and to Kant’s duty of “hospitality.”105
Scott Warren’s lawyer argued to the jury, “Being a good samaritan [sic] is not
against the law, following the golden rule is not a felony.”106 One could perhaps
view this as an implicit invocation of fraternity. But it is a narrower argument against
proof of alleged criminal intent. The potential power of fraternity is stronger: as a
constitutional principle, it could – as some legal commentators have advocated –
override government attempts to criminalize all sorts of arguably socially just
behaviors.107 This is especially powerful in migration cases where the principle
102 J. Fitzjames Stephan, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (London: H. Elder & Co., 1874), p. 106.
103 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France: A Critical Edition (J. C. D. Clark ed.,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
104 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, United Nations General
Assembly Res. 217A(III), pmbl.
105 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals (T. Humphrey,
trans., Hackett: 1983), pp. 118–120.
106 Ingram, “Scott Warren Found Not Guilty.”
107 See Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” at 570; see also G. Canivet, “La fraternité”;
J. C. Colliard, “Liberté, égalité, fraternité,” in L’État de droit: mélanges en l’honneur de Guy
Braibant (Dalloz, 1996), pp. 100–101, www.worldcat.org/title/etat-de-droit-melanges-en-lhon
neur-de-guy-braibant/oclc/247045796/editions?referer=di&editionsView=true; M. Borgetto,
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has a dual dimension: “a collective one based on solidarity and an individual one
based on tolerance.”108
Solidarity
Solidarity, too, may have this dual dimension. Solidarity has typically been viewed as
an internal value within communities.109 However, it also may apply – like human-
ity and fraternity – to global issues. As Pope Francis has put it, “No one can remain
insensitive to the inequalities that persist in the world.”110 He then called for “a
valuable lesson in solidarity, a word that is too often forgotten or silenced because it
is uncomfortable,” as he appealed to “those in possession of greater resources, to
public authorities and to all people of good will who are working for social justice:
never tire of working for a more just world, marked by greater solidarity.”111 Other
exponents of the Catholic social teaching ideal of solidarity similarly emphasize the
relationship between fraternity and solidarity. Pope Benedict XVI once noted that
“As society becomes ever more globalized, it makes us neighbours but does not
make us brothers.”112 On this view, solidarity is “simply the demand of fraternity, that
we treat each other as brothers and sisters.”113 The Catechism of the Catholic
Church thus emphasizes solidarity “among nations and peoples. International soli-
darity is a requirement of the moral order; world peace depends in part upon this.”114
“La notion de fraternité en droit public français. Le passé, le présent et l’avenir de la solidarité”
(1993) 48(1) Revue internationale de droit comparé 215–217.
108 C. Dadomo, “‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’: The French Constitutional Court Confirms the
Constitutional Status and Force of the Principle of Fraternity,” EU Law and Policy, September
21, 2018, https://eulawpol57.wordpress.com/2018/09/21/liberty-equality-fraternity-the-french-con
stitutional-court-confirms-the-constitutional-status-and-force-of-the-principle-of-fraternity/ (“By
ruling that ‘fraternity is a constitutional principle from which ensues the freedom to assist
others for humanitarian reasons without consideration as to whether the assisted person is
legally residing or not within the French territory’ (paras 7 and 8 of the ruling), the
Constitutional Court not only stresses the humanitarian dimension of acts of assistance but
also provides the freedom to assist a general scope of application irrespective of whether the
assisted person has a legal right or not to reside in France.”).
109 See e.g., P. Kropotkin,Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (New York: McClure Phillips & Co.,
1902); E. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (George Simpson, trans., New York: The
Free Press, 1947).
110 Address of Pope Francis, Visit to the Community of Varginha (Maguinhos): Apostolstic Journey








114 Pope John Paul II, Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992), part 3, § 1, chapter 2, art. 3, www
.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c2a3.htm (emphasis added).
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It is noteworthy that activists such as Cédric Herrou and Captains Rackete and
Klemp sometimes refer, ironically, to the crimes with which they have been charged
as crimes of solidarity.115 This reflects how solidarity operates both as a normative
principle and as legal doctrine in Europe. Article 2 of the 1993 Treaty on European
Union (TEU) lists values that are common to the member states.116 It then states that
these values are common in a society in which “pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”117 The
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights lists solidarity more prominently and specifically
as a value. Chapter IV of the Charter, “Solidarity” (which precedes the chapter on
“Citizens’ Rights”), lists rights of workers, prohibits child labor, protects family rights
(including protections against dismissal due to maternal and guaranteeing parental
leaves), social security, health care, access to “services of general economic interest,”
environmental protection, and consumer protection.118 Thus, solidarity appears in
the European Union as a “vector of concrete social rights . . . aimed at the protection
of individuals as such or in their economic capacity.”119
Solidarity, like some narrow visions of fraternity, may also work as an exclusionary
principle. This can be seen in situations where solidarity is not viewed as a universal
construct, but is limited to particular communities. Article 67 § 2 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, for example, mandates a common policy
on asylum, immigration, and external border control, which is based on solidarity
between member states but which is simply “fair” toward third-country nationals.120
Necessity
The lawyers in Warren’s case and those planning the defense of Pia Klemp also rely
on the defense of necessity. This defense, a form of justification, has been most
simply defined as “the assertion that conduct promotes some value higher than the
value of literal compliance with the law.”121 Others have called it the choice of “the
115 See also, L. Fekete, “Europe: Crimes of Solidarity” (2009) 50(4) Race and Class 83–97; M.
Tazzioli, “Crimes of Solidarity: Migration and Containment through Rescue” (2018) 2.01(2)
Radical Philosophy 1–10, www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/crimes-of-solidarity#:~:text=
Crimes%20of%20solidarity%20put%20in,migrants‘%20acts%20of%20spatial%20disobedience
.andtext=In%20this%20way%2C%20crimes%20of,crisis’%20and%20’security.
116 Treaty on the European Union, November 1, 1993, www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39218.html
(“[H]uman dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”).
117 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, December 13, 2007, 2008/C 115/01,
www.refworld.org/docid/4b179f222.html.
118 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, December 18, 2000, 2000/C 364/01,
www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf.
119 Editorial, “Fraternité” at 2.
120 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01, tit. V, chapter 1, art. 67, § 2,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E%2FTXT.
121 G. Williams, The Criminal Law § 229 (2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1953).
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lesser evil.”122 It is obviously related to broader concepts within the Anglo-American
adversarial system, such as jury nullification, and to related defenses such as
“excuse.”123 But there is a basic distinction between an excuse and a justification:
that between being “forgivably wrong” versus being right. Thus, a person who claims
justification does not seek pardon, nor argue for mitigation or excuse. Justification
implies that there is no need for forgiveness.124
Though its roots in Anglo-American law are complex and interwoven with various
semantic formulations, the basic idea of necessity has long resided at the intersection
between positive law and moral principle.125 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his
1883 treatise, referred to the necessity defense as “one of the curiosities of law,” and a
subject on which the law of England was “so vague that if cases raising the question
should ever occur the judges would practically be able to lay down any rule which
they considered expedient.”126 One might well ponder whether this renders neces-
sity too vague to be a meaningful legal principle, perhaps more a matter of discretion
than law.127 In fact, necessity has sometimes been used as an epithet against judges
themselves. A nineteenth-century Texas Justice of the Peace was reportedly known
as “Old Necessity” because he knew so little about the law. Deadwood judge, W. R.
Keithly, apparently had the same moniker during the Gold Rush.128 Others, how-
ever, have historically sided with Sir Walter Scott that although the law of necessity
“is not well furnished with precise rules . . . necessity creates the law; it supersedes
rules; and whatever is reasonable and just in such circumstances is likewise legal.”129
The way in which the necessity principle has informed the development of
international law illustrates its potential limitations.130 Robert Phillimore cites
122 E. Arnolds and N. Garland, “The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose
the Lesser Evil” (1975) 65(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 289–301, https://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5903&context=jclc.
123 See ibid. (“To justify does not mean to excuse; justification is a circumstance which actually
exists and which makes harmful conduct proper and noncriminal, while excuse is a circum-
stance which excuses the actor from criminal liability even though the actor was technically
not justified in doing what he did.”) (citing Final Report of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, § 601 (1971)).
124 Ibid., p. 290.
125 For a general overview, see A. Brudner, “A Theory of Necessity” (1987) 7(3) Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 339–368.
126 J. Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan & Co,
1883), vol. II, p. 108.
127 See D. Kanstroom, “Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in
U.S. Immigration Law” (1997) 71 Tulane Law Review 703–818.
128 J. Agnew, Crime, Justice and Retribution in the American West 1850–1900 (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Company, 2017), p. 180.
129 The Gratitudine, 3 Rob. Adm. R. 240 (1801); R. A. Anderson (ed.), Wharton’s Criminal Law, 5
vols. (12th ed., Rochester, NY: Lawyer’s Cooperative Publishing, 1957), vol 1, chapter 3, part 7,
sub. 126.
130 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (London: Hodges, Foster & Co., 1871),
vol 2.
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Lord Stowell, who opined that “a clear necessity will be a sufficient justification of
everything that is done fairly and with good faith under it.”131
One’s potential admiration for Cédric Herrou or Captains Rackete and Klemp
should not obscure the difficulties inherent in the defense of necessity, however. Its
invocation is always – indeed inevitably – highly controversial.132 It arose famously in
nineteenth-century cases of cannibalism among those adrift on the high seas. The
British Home Office133 and judges reportedly worried that if yielding to temptation
were sanctioned, necessity might become “the legal cloak for unbridled passion and
atrocious crime.”134 Perhaps the most salient example of this is that necessity was
invoked as a defense to prosecution by the defendants at Nuremberg, whose counsel
argued that a necessity defense “must also be considered one of the fundamental
principles of the criminal law of all civilized nations.”135
the (re-)birth of rights through fraternity, solidarity,
and necessity
Hannah Arendt famously (and chillingly) noted the failures of abstract human rights
principles to protect “national minorities” and stateless people prior to the Second
World War: “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being
human.”136 Arendt reasoned that, to have meaningful rights, individuals must be
more than mere human beings; they must be members of a political community.
She called this right the “right to have rights.” As she wrote in The Origins of
Totalitarianism: “We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights [to live
in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions] and a right to
belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people
emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights.”137
131 Ibid., p. 110.
132 The phrase “Neede hath no law,” an English version of the Latin proverb, necessitas non habet
legem, has been traced as far back in the fourteenth-century work, “Piers Plowman.” J. Simpson
and J. Speake (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (5th ed., Oxford, UK and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008) www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199539536
.001.0001/acref-9780199539536-e-1526; see generally H. Potter, Law, Liberty, and the
Constitution: A Brief History of the Common Law (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2015),
p. 241.
133 The Home Office is a ministerial department of Her Majesty’s Government of the United
Kingdom, responsible for immigration, security, and law and order. “Home Office,”
Government of the United Kingdom, www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office.
134 Ibid.; see also Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 QBD 273 (1884).
135 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (Washington, DC: United
States Government Printing Office, 1952) vol. 8, pp. 986–987, www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VIII.pdf.
136 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Books, 1994), p. 299; see also S.
DeGooyer et al., The Right to Have Rights (London: Verso, 2018).
137 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 294.
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The cases of Herrou, Warren, and Captains Rackete and Klemp challenge this
rather circumscribed formulation. They offer powerful examples of how encounters
at or near the borders of the “organized community” between potentially “rightless”
outsiders and state agents cannot be completely insulated from legally salient human
rights claims. Rights norms grounded in fraternity, solidarity, and necessity are, to be
sure, complex and nuanced. They arise in technically detailed ways at particular
points of legal processes. Moreover, one might object that, in all of the cases
discussed herein, they have been successfully deployed not by migrants themselves
but derivatively by those who sought to aid them. This is an important objection. But
it does not disprove my main thesis. Logically, one cannot make sense of fraternity,
solidarity, or even necessity without acknowledging that the migrants themselves
must be understood to have certain basic human rights, too, albeit in a perhaps
rather nascent form. As evolving legal principles, they are thus firmer, more distinct,
more crystalized, more enforceable, and more a part of law itself than, for example,
an aspirational ideal such as charity.
To be sure, this is a challenge for human rights theories in general. As Jacques
Rancière has noted, echoing Arendt: “the Rights of Man turned out to be the rights
of the rightless, of the populations hunted out of their homes and land and
threatened by ethnic slaughter. They appeared more and more as the rights of the
victims, the rights of those who were unable to enact any rights or even any claim in
their name.”138 The effects of this, as well illustrated by the cases described herein,
are problematic in many ways. For one thing, as Rancière highlights, “eventually
their rights had to be upheld by others, at the cost of shattering the edifice of
International Rights, in the name of a new right to ‘humanitarian interference.’”139
This raises the old concern of Arendt that “the ‘man’ of the Rights of Man was a
mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens, the rights
attached to a national community as such.”140
But a deeper analysis of such ostensibly humanitarian cases offers a more optimis-
tic rights vision. Fraternity, for example, is a dialogical concept. It implies certain
human rights that go beyond those of Herrou to be kind, as it were, to any living
creature. While the Conseil was at pains not to create an explicit right to enter
France, the extension of what one might call derivative constitutional fraternity
rights to those on French soil without legal status is a conceptual step forward from
the EU ideals of solidarity and surely a more powerful rights principle than using
necessity merely as a defense.
Moments such as the encounters between Herrou, Warren, Captains Rackete and
Klemp, and state agents are significant because they also involve the presence of
138 J. Rancière, “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” (2004) 103(2) South Atlantic Quarterly
297–298.
139 Ibid. at 298.
140 Ibid.
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other human beings, the migrants themselves, who have definable – and perhaps
someday enforceable – rights claims. Thus, justice and rights are much more than “a
negotiation between the conflicting rights of members of a community.”141 These
encounters illustrate a profound negotiation between the rights of members of a
community and the rights of those who are not members of that, or perhaps of any
legally cognizable, community.142
Legal challenges by, on behalf of, or in relation to unauthorized migrants are
often seen by governments as an impediment or an annoyance, if not part of a crime.
Others view such claims more positively, but still in an impoverished way – as, at
best, a humanitarian corrective against occasional harsh practices. But such invoca-
tions of evolving legal principle are much more than this. As the Herrou case
demonstrates quite clearly, they are part of the dynamic process of mediating
the inevitable tension between majoritarian, “sovereign” power and the rights
aspects of law. Indeed, this is a component of the essential revitalizing project
of both constitutional democracy and of international human rights law. As
Bonnie Honig has suggested, we should reframe the traditional question:
“How should ‘we’ solve the problem of foreignness?”143 That question inevitably
leads us to ask what “we” should do about “them.” A more intriguing and useful
inquiry is: “What problems does foreignness solve for us?”144 The most important
such problem is how – in a real, tangible way – to implement Martha Nussbaum’s
admonition that, “[w]e should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its
fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and
respect.”145
In sum, noncitizens, especially the unauthorized and ostensibly “rightless,” are
uniquely positioned to challenge, to critique, and to improve the meaning of law in
constitutional democracies and of international human rights. This is both despite
and because of the threats and disadvantages they experience. Through the legal
system, noncitizens are a crucial part of a “circular process that recursively feeds
back” into engagement and debate.146 Since legitimate lawmaking both responds to
and generates communicative power from, as it were, below, noncitizens play a
central role in translating communicative power into administrative power and law.
141 S. Degooyer and A. Hunt, “The Right to Have Rights,” Public Books, May 5, 2018, www
.publicbooks.org/the-right-to-have-rights/.
142 Ibid.
143 B. Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 4.
144 Ibid.
145 M. C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” Boston Review, October 1, 1994, http://
bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php.
146 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (William Rehg, trans., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 130; see also
Kanstroom, “Alien’ Litigation as Polity-Participation.”
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The reactions of the French Parliament to the Conseil decision in the Herrou case
illustrate this phenomenon well. Although the cases described in this chapter offer
only moderate cause for optimism in terms of a more robust and comprehensive
corpus of rights for migrants, the evolution of principles such as fraternity and
solidarity may yet benefit not only “them,” but all of us, together.
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